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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court

of Appeals pursuant

to Section 78-2a-3(2) (e), Utah

Code

Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

DOES
DEFENDANT
CAREE
F.
MCDONALD
("MCDONALD") HAVE A RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
FOR A "PETTY" OFFENSE SUCH AS A MINOR
TRAFFIC VIOLATION?

This issue is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on
a "correctness" standard.
II.

State

v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

IS IT WITHIN THE POWER OF THE TRIAL
COURT, PRIOR TO TRIAL, TO LIMIT THE
POTENTIAL SENTENCE THAT MAY BE IMPOSED BY
REDUCING THE POTENTIAL SENTENCE FOR A
SPEEDING VIOLATION FROM A CLASS "C"
MISDEMEANOR TO AN INFRACTION?

This issue is a conclusion of law, and should be reviewed on
a "correctness" standard.

State v. Pena,

869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN DENYING MCDONALD'S REQUEST THAT THE
HEARING ON HER MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL BE
HELD PRIOR TO THE DAY OF TRIAL, AND IN
DENYING HER MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE AFTER
THE COURT HAD DENIED THE MOTION FOR JURY
TRIAL?
This issue is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and
State

should
v.

be reviewed

Cabututan,

on an "abuse

of discretion"

861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993).

1

standard.

IV.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN SENTENCING MCDONALD TO A FINE THAT
EXCEEDS THE RECOMMENDED FINE SET FORTH IN
THE UNIFORM FINE SCHEDULE?

This issue is within the sound discretion of the trial court,
and
State

should
v.

be

Yoder,

reviewed

on

an

"abuse

of

discretion"

standard.

935 P.2d 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment VI:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed,
which
district
shall
have
been
previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10:
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.]
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate.
In courts of general jurisdiction, except in
capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors.
In
courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In
civil cases, three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict.
A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.
1896
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been
2

committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife,
nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.
Where
the
defendant
is
otherwise
entitled
to
a
preliminary examination, the function of that examination is
limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution
shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or
rule.
1994
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-3-204:
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction - Term of imprisonment.
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be
sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term
not exceeding one year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term
not exceeding six months;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term
not exceeding ninety days.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-3-301:
76-3-301. Fines of persons.
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to
pay a fine, not exceeding:
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first
degree or second degree;
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third
degree;
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction;
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction;
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or
infraction conviction; and
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by
statute.

3

(2) This section does not apply to a
association,
partnership,
government,
or
instrumentality.

corporation,
governmental

Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-3-301.5:
76-3-301.5. Uniform fine schedule - Judicial Council.
(1) The Judicial Council shall establish a uniform
recommended fine schedule for each offense under Subsection
76-3-301 (1) .
(a) The fine for each offense shall proportionally
reflect the seriousness of the offense and other factors
as determined in writing by the Judicial Council.
(b) The schedule shall be reviewed annually by the
Judicial Council.
(c) The fines shall be collected under Section
77-18-1.
(2) The schedule shall incorporate:
(a)
criteria
for
determining
aggravating
and
mitigating circumstances; and
(b) guidelines for enhancement or reduction of the
fine, based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
(3) Presentence investigation reports shall include
documentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as
determined under the criteria, and a recommended fine under
the schedule.
(4) The Judicial Council shall also establish a separate
uniform recommended fine schedule for the juvenile court and
by rule provide for its implementation.
(5) This section does not prohibit the court from in its
discretion imposing no fine, or a fine in any amount up to and
including the maximum fine, for the offense.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6:
77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by
counsel;
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed
against him;
(c) To testify in his own behalf;
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district where the offense is alleged to
have been committed;
4

(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial within 30
days after arraignment if unable to post bail and if the
business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure rights
guaranteed by the Constitution or the laws of Utah, or to
pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband nor a husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or
upon a judgment of a court when trial by jury has been
waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by
a magistrate.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 4:
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses.
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be
prosecuted by indictment or information sworn to by a person
having reason to believe the offense has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense
for which the defendant is being prosecuted by using the name
given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating
in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to
give the defendant notice of the charge. An information may
contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient
to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged
where appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent,
manner, value and ownership need not be alleged unless
necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money,
securities, written
instruments, pictures, statutes
and
judgments may be described by any name or description by which
they are generally known or by which they may be identified
without setting forth a copy. However, details concerning such
things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither
presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be
stated..
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language
from an indictment or information.

5

(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to
be amended at any time before verdict if no additional or
different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or
information may be amended so as to state the offense with
such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense upon the same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or
indictment are required to inform a defendant of the nature
and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion
for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at
arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later
time as the court may permit. The court may, on its own
motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of
particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time subject
to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and
contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a
statement of factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held
invalid because any name contained therein may be incorrectly
spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception,
excuse or proviso contained in the statute creating or
defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according
to their usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined by
law or have acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive
shall not invalidate the indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose
evidence
an
indictment or information was based shall be endorsed thereon
before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the
validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on
application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting
attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish
the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names
are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall
issue directing it to appear before the magistrate. Appearance
may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a
corporation shall be the same as against a natural person.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE

OF THE

CASE

This case involves a prosecution and conviction in the Third
Judicial District Court, West Valley Department, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah,

for a violation of Section

41-6-46, Utah Code

Annotated 1953, as amended, "Speeding."
COURSE

OF

PROCEEDINGS

Prosecution

in

this

case was commenced

by the

filing

of

charges against Defendant Caree F. McDonald on February 5, 1996.
The actual date of the speeding violation, which was detected by
the use of photo-radar, was January 6, 1996.

(Record, p. 1.)

On

April 15, 1996, the City filed an Information, formally charging
McDonald with a violation of Section 41-6-46.

(Record, p. 5.)

A

pretrial conference was held before Judge Esqueda on May 1, 1996.
McDonald

was

represented

by

counsel

at

the pretrial

hearing;

however, the case was not resolved and was set for a bench trial.
On May 7, 1996, McDonald filed a Motion to Dismiss (Record,
pp. 8-9), to which the City filed a response (Record, pp. 27-31).
On

June

7,

1996, the City

(Record, pp. 32-33.)
speeding

charges

Information.

The Amended Information contained the same

as the original

penalty from class

filed an Amended

Information, but

NN

reduced

C" misdemeanor to infraction status.

Amended Information was accepted by the trial court.
1996, McDonald filed a Motion for Jury Trial.

7

the
This

On June 13,

On January 20, 1996, following a hearing on the matter, the
trial judge denied McDonald's Motion to Dismiss and her Motion for
Jury Trial, and then

recessed

to handle other matters.

Upon

resuming this case, the trial court denied McDonald's Motion for
Continuance and proceeded to trial.
DISPOSITION

IN

TRIAL

COURT

At the bench trial on June 20, 1996, the trial court convicted
McDonald

of

speeding.

The

trial

judge

imposed

fines

and

assessments in the amount of $60 and required McDonald to complete
traffic school.

(Record, pp. 44-45.)

was filed on July 16, 1996.

McDonald's Notice of Appeal

(Record, p. 55.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

MCDONALD DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL FOR A "PETTY" OFFENSE SUCH AS
A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION.

There exists no Utah case law interpreting the "right to a
jury" provisions

of

the

Utah Constitution.

Therefore,

it

is

appropriate to look to interpretations of analogous provisions of
the United States Constitution for guidance in interpreting the
Utah

Constitution.

The

United

States

Supreme

Court

has

unequivocally determined that no right to a jury under the United
States

Constitution

exists

for

"petty"

offenses.

The

classification of an offense as "petty" is determined by examining
potential penalties and is based upon the historical lack of a
right to a jury trial in "petty" cases.
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The interpretation of the

Utah Constitution based upon this type of analysis leads to the
conclusion

that

McDonald

was

not

entitled

to

a

jury

trial

regardless of whether she was charged with a class "C" misdemeanor
or

an

infraction,

offenses.

since

both

would

be

classified

as

"petty"

This is especially true since the Utah Constitution

provision regarding the right to a jury trial was drafted in more
narrow

language

provision.

than

the analogous

United

States

Constitution

McDonald's alternate arguments founded upon Article I,

Section 10 of the Utah Constitution and Section 77-1-6 of the Utah
Code likewise do not establish her right to a jury trial.
II.

IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF THE TRIAL
COURT, PRIOR TO TRIAL, TO ELIMINATE
INCARCERATION AS A POTENTIAL PENALTY THAT
MAY BE IMPOSED, BY REDUCING THE POTENTIAL
SENTENCE FOR A SPEEDING VIOLATION FROM A
CLASS "C" MISDEMEANOR TO AN INFRACTION.

McDonald's argument regarding the reduction in the penalty for
speeding from a class "C" misdemeanor to an infraction focuses on
the power of the prosecutor to make such a change.
mischaracterizes the issue.

This argument

It is not the power of the prosecutor,

but rather the discretion of the trial court judge, that allows
this reduction

in penalty to take place.

The only effect of

XX

reducing the charge from a class

C" misdemeanor to an infraction

is a reduction in the penalty that may be imposed by the trial
judge.
the

By allowing amendment of the charge down to an infraction,

trial

judge

incarceration

is

agreeing,

from among

prior

his sentencing
9

to

trial,

options.

to

exclude

Trial

court

judges in Utah are granted wide latitude with regard to their
sentencing decisions, and this is simply an action within the
judge's discretion with regard to sentencing.
McDonald's arguments regarding the City's and the trial court
judge's failure to follow Rule 4(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure are without merit.

Contrary to McDonald's assertion,

Rule 4 (d) does not require the City to petition the court for
permission to file an Amended Information.

Also, McDonald has

provided no credible argument that a reduction in the possible
penalty

associated

with

her

offense

has

deprived

her

of

any

substantial right.
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING MCDONALD'S REQUEST
THAT THE HEARING ON HER MOTION FOR JURY
TRIAL BE HELD PRIOR TO THE DAY OF TRIAL,
AND IN DENYING HER MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT HAD DENIED THE
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL.
Utah trial courts are granted a great deal of discretion with
respect to scheduling matters and granting or denying Motions for
Continuance.

Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the trial

court's decisions will not be disturbed on appeal.

In this case,

McDonald has failed to show any abuse of discretion whatsoever on
the part of the trial judge.
confusing.

Her arguments are in conflict and

First, she argues that the hearing on her Motion for

Jury Trial should not have been held on the same day the case was
set for a bench trial.

Part of her rationale on this argument is

10

that the court was not prepared to go forward with a jury trial on
that date and would have had to continue the case until a jury
could be assembled.

Then, she makes the argument that the denial

of

Continuance

the

Motion

for

deprived

her

of

her

right

to

adequately prepare for a bench trial, since she had apparently
arrived at court prepared to conduct a jury trial.

McDonald had

received notice that a bench trial was to be held on June 20, 1996,
and admits in her argument that she knew a jury trial could not be
conducted on that day.

If she was unprepared for a bench trial on

June 20, it is simply through her own negligence and not through
any fault of the courts.

This argument by McDonald is without

merit, and should be disregarded by this Court.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN SENTENCING MCDONALD TO A
FINE THAT EXCEEDS THE RECOMMENDED FINE
SET FORTH IN THE UNIFORM FINE SCHEDULE.

It is well established that Utah trial court judges have wide
discretion in their sentencing decisions. Those decisions will not
be

overturned

on

appeal

unless

they

are

inherently

unfair,

excessive, or such that no reasonable person* would take the view
adopted by the trial court.

In this case, the bail was set at $57.

The sentence imposed by the trial court was a fine of $60 and
attendance at traffic school, which costs an additional $30.

Fines

and assessments in this case are obviously within the $0 to $750
range

of

fines

applicable

to infractions.

McDonald

makes

no

credible argument supporting her claim that the fine is excessive
11

or unfair.
establishing
misplaced.

Also, her reliance on the Uniform Fine Schedule in
what

she

believes

the

fine

should

have

been

is

The Criminal Code provision establishing the Uniform

Fine Schedule specifically grants judges the discretion to impose
any fine allowed by law, whether or not it is in conformance with
the recommended

fine in the Fine Schedule.

Also, McDonald is

incorrect in stating that the bail for this offense was $50.

The

Record clearly indicates that the bail set in this case was $57.
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

MCDONALD DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO A
JURY TRIAL FOR A "PETTY" OFFENSE SUCH AS
A MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATION.

McDonald does not have a right to a jury trial in a case
involving a "petty" offense, regardless of whether that offense is
classified as a class "C" misdemeanor or an infraction.

McDonald

points to the Utah Constitution as the source of her perceived
right to a jury trial.

However, a close analysis of the language

of the Utah Constitution reveals that no such right exists.
Utah courts may determine that it is appropriate to interpret
state

constitutional

provisions

constitutional provisions.
999 (Utah 1994).
render

an opinion

West

v.

differently
Thompson

from

Newspapers,

federal
872 P.2d

However, the Utah appellate courts have yet to
as to whether

or not the Utah

Constitution

provides a right to a trial by jury in so-called "petty" offenses.
Therefore, it is appropriate to examine the United States Supreme

12

Court's interpretation of similar provisions of the United States
Constitution and to apply that analysis to the language of the Utah
Constitution.
McDonald

relies

upon

Article

I,

Section

12

of

the

Utah

Constitution, which states in part: "In criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall have the right . . . to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
Utah Const,

alleged to have been committed . . . .

art.

I,

§

12.

The analogous provision of the United States Constitution is found
in

the

Sixth

Amendment,

which

states:

"In

all

criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . . .
In Duncan

v.

Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145

U.S.

Const,

amend.

VI.

(1968), the United States

Supreme Court held that, "There is a category of petty crimes or
offenses which is not subject to the Sixth Amendment jury trial
provision."

Duncan,

at

159.

The

Duncan

court

found

that

historically there had been a class of "petty" crimes that had not
been tried before juries.

The court found that the framers of the

United States Constitution intended to continue this practice when
drafting the Sixth Amendment and that only "serious" crimes invoke
the right to a jury trial.
The case of Blanton

v.

Duncan,
City

at 159-160.

of North

(1989), reaffirmed the holding in Duncan
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Las

Vegas,

489 U.S. 538

and provided a test for

lower courts to determine whether a criminal defendant is entitled
to a jury trial.

In Blanton,

the defendants were charged with

first-time "driving under the influence of alcohol" charges.

The

D.U.I, charges carried a penalty of up to six months' incarceration
and a fine of up to $1,000.

The Blanton

court, therefore, was

dealing with charges carrying a much greater penalty than that
faced by McDonald, even if her charge is considered to be a class
"C" misdemeanor.

In Utah, a class "C" misdemeanor

maximum penalty of 90 days in jail and a fine of $750.
Ann.,

carries a
Utah

Code

§§ 76-3-204(3) and 76-3-301(1)(e), (1953).
In Blanton,

penalty

attached

the United States Supreme Court focused upon the
to

a crime

in determining

whether

it was a

"serious" crime requiring the opportunity for a jury trial, or
whether the crime could be classified as "petty," in which case, no
right to a jury trial exists.

The Court particularly focused on

the period of incarceration and stated:
Primary emphasis, however, must be placed on
the
maximum
authorized
period
of
incarceration. Penalties such as probation or
a
fine
may
engender
"a
significant
infringement of personal freedom," id.,
at
151, but they cannot approximate in severity
the loss of liberty that a prison term
entails. Indeed, because incarceration is an
"intrinsically different" form of punishment,
Muniz v. Hoffman,
422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975), it
is the most powerfuL indication of whether an
offense is "serious."
Blanton,

at 542.
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The Court went on to establish six months as the demarcation
line

between

"serious"

and

previous decision in Baldwin
Court

established

"petty"
v.

offenses.

New York,

Following

its

399 U.S. 66 (1970), the

that defendants are entitled

to jury

trials

whenever the offense for which the person is charged carries a
maximum authorized

term of greater than six months.

Blanton,

at 543.
The Blanton

Court declined to find that an offense carrying a

maximum prison term of six months or less was automatically a
"petty" offense. However, the Court established a presumption that
such an offense is "petty" and stated:
A defendant is entitled to a jury trial in
such circumstances only if he can demonstrate
that any additional statutory penalties,
viewed
in conjunction with
the maximum
authorized period of incarceration, are so
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative
determination that the offense in question is
a "serious" one.
This standard, albeit
somewhat
imprecise,
should
ensure
the
availability of a jury trial in the rare
situation where a legislature packs an offense
it deems "serious" with onerous penalties that
nonetheless "do not puncture the 6-month
incarceration line."
Blanton,

at 543.

Last year, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
holding in Blanton.

In Lewis

v.

United

States,

its

116 S. Ct. 2163

(1996), the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not entitled
to a jury trial, even though he was charged with two counts of
"obstructing the mail," each of which carried a maximum authorized
15

prison term of six months, so that the aggregate maximum prison
term exceeded six months.
The Court in Lewis

stated:

"The Constitution's guarantee of

the right to a jury trial extends only to serious offenses."
Court also stated:

The

"An offense carrying a maximum prison term of

six months or less is presumed petty unless the legislature has
authorized additional statutory penalties so severe as to indicate
that the legislature considered the offense serious/'

Lewis,

at

2166.
It is clear from the foregoing United States Supreme Court
analysis and case law that McDonald is not entitled to a jury trial
on the basis of the language of the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.

The analysis that lead to this conclusion can

likewise be applied to the language of Article I, Section 12 of the
Utah Constitution.
As can be seen in the quotations set forth at the beginning of
this argument, the language of the United States Constitution and
the language of the Utah Constitution are virtually identical.
However, there* exists one very important difference.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution begins
with the phrase, "In all
added.)
omit

criminal prosecutions . . . ."

(Emphasis

The drafters of the Utah Constitution, however, chose to

the

word

"all"

when

drafting

the

Utah

Constitution.

Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution begins, "In criminal
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prosecutions . . . ."

By omitting the word "all," the drafters of

the Utah Constitution clearly intended to narrow the scope of the
jury trial right in the Utah Constitution in comparison with the
analogous provision of the United States Constitution.
As was demonstrated above in Blanton

and the other United

States Supreme Court cases cited, the United States Constitution,
which contains the inclusive word "all," has not been interpreted
to include "petty" offenses. Based on the federal analysis and the
difference in language between the two Constitutions, it seems
elementary

that

if the

right

to a jury

trial

for an

offense

carrying a maximum penalty of 90 days' incarceration and $750 fine
does not invoke the right to a jury trial under the expansive
United States Constitution, then it certainly would not trigger
such a right under the more narrowly written Utah Constitution.
McDonald

makes

the

additional

argument

that

the

Utah

Constitution affords her a right to trial by jury, even if the
charges against her are characterized as civil.

This argument is

clearly inapplicable in this case, since the Record is devoid of
any

indication

that

the

offense

considered to be a civil offense.

committed

by

McDonald

was

To the contrary, the City and

the trial court considered the offense to be a criminal offense
(either a class "C" misdemeanor or an infraction), albeit a "petty"
criminal offense.
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Even if McDonald was correct in categorizing this case as
civil, her arguments are unpersuasive.

McDonald's support for her

"civil" jury trial argument rests primarily on the language in
Article I, Section 10 of the Utah Constitution.
language

She interprets the

NN

a jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded" as

requiring a jury trial in all civil cases in which a jury demand is
filed.

In Hyatt

This is clearly not the law in Utah.

P.2d 299

v. Hill,

714

(Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court, in construing the

meaning of Article I, Section 10, stated:

"The constitutional

right to a trial by jury is preserved and currently exists only in
actions so triable when the Constitution was adopted."
301.

Hyatt,

at

The Court has also stated that the right to a jury trial

"extends only to cases that would have been cognizable at law at
the time the Constitution was adopted."
v.

Rocky

Mountain

Irrigation,

Inc.,

Zions

First

National

Bank

795 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1990).

In a recent case, which determined that Article I,

Section 10 of

the Utah Constitution does not provide the right to a jury trial in
parental rights termination proceedings, the Utah Court of Appeals
concluded

that

if

the

action

did

not

exist

when

the

State

Constitution was adopted, it was unnecessary to address whether or
not it was the type of action that would have required a jury trial
at that time.

T.R.B.

v.

State

of Utah,

Ct. App. 1997).
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311 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah

In applying this standard to the instant case, it is plain
that no right to a jury trial based upon Article I, Section 10 is
applicable.

The annotations to Section 41-6-46 of the Utah Code,

the section under which McDonald was convicted, indicate that the
statute was first enacted in 1953.
contained

in

Article

6,

Chapter

In fact, the oldest section
6

of

Title

41,

"Speed

Restrictions," appears from the annotations to have been adopted in
1941.

Since the Utah Constitution was adopted in 1896, before the

invention of motor vehicles, it appears extremely unlikely that
speeding violations existed at the time of the adoption of the Utah
Constitution.

Therefore, McDonald's argument must fail.

This historically-based rationale, which has been used by the
Utah courts in interpreting Article I, Section 10 of the Utah
Constitution, is philosophically very similar to the United States
Supreme Court's historical analysis of the Sixth Amendment referred
to

earlier

Section 12.

with

regard

to

the

interpretation

For example, in Duncan

v.

Louisiana,

of

Article

I,

391 U.S. 145

(1968), the United States Supreme Court stated:
So-called petty offenses were tried without
juries both in England and in the colonies and
have always been held to be exempt from the
otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial provisions. There is
no substantial evidence that the framers
intended to depart from this established
common-law practice.
Duncan,

at 160.

This rationale has also been relied upon by other

state courts, e.g., Austin

v. Denver,
19

462 P.2d 600 (Colo. 1969).

McDonald also makes the statutory argument that Section 77-1-6
of the Utah Code provides a state law basis for the right to a jury
trial.

SectLon 77-1-6 states:

defendant is entitled

. . .

"In criminal prosecutions the

(f) To a speedy public trial by an

impartial jury . . . ." This statute is virtually identical to the
language

contained

Constitution.
embodied m

in

ArtLcle

I,

Section

12

of

the

Utah

The statute creates no right greater than that

the Constitution; therefore, if Article I, Section 12

does not provide McDonald with a right to a jury trial in this
case, neither would Section 77-1-6.
Finally,

it

should

be noted

that

the Record

contains

no

references to state constitutional provisions in the arguments made
to the trial court.

In previous cases, this Court has declined to

address state constitutional issues that were not raised before the
trial court.

In those cases, it was found to be appropriate to

proceed under a federal constitutional law analysis

State

Dudley,

803 P.2d

847 P.2d 424 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State

v

Bobo,

v.

1268 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Based

upon

Constitution

the

creates

foregoing,
no

right

it

is

to a jury

clear

that

trial

for

the
a

Utah

"petty"

offense.

Since there is no case law interpreting the applicable

sections

of

interpretation

the
of

Utah

Constitution,

analogous

the

provisions

of

courts

may

the

United

look

to

States

Constitution for guidance in interpreting the Utah Constitution.
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The United States Supreme Court has unequivocally determined that
no right to a jury under the United States Constitution would exist
in this case, since McDonald, at worst, faced a maximum penalty of
90 days in jail and a $750 fine.

This analysis by the United

States Supreme Court was based upon both the classification of the
offense as "petty" due to its relatively minor penalties, and also
upon the historical lack of a right to a jury trial in "petty"
cases.

An analysis of the Utah Constitution based upon these

factors leads to the same conclusion; specifically, that McDonald
is not entitled
offense.

to a jury trial in a case involving

a minor

This is especially true since the Utah Constitution

provisions regarding the right to a jury trial were drafted in more
narrow language than the United States Constitution.

McDonald's

alternate arguments founded upon Article I, Section 10 of the Utah
Constitution and Section 77-1-6 of the Utah Code likewise do not
establish her right to a jury trial.

Regardless of whether the

speeding offense that McDonald was charged with is considered a
class "C" misdemeanor or an infraction, she has no right to a jury
trial under the Utah Constitution, the United States Constitution,
or the statutes of the State of Utah.

21

II.

IT IS WITHIN THE POWER OF THE TRIAL
COURT, PRIOR TO TRIAL, TO ELIMINATE
INCARCERATION AS A POTENTIAL PENALTY THAT
MAY BE IMPOSED, BY REDUCING THE POTENTIAL
SENTENCE FOR A SPEEDING VIOLATION FROM A
CLASS "C" MISDEMEANOR TO AN INFRACTION.

In this case, it was proper for the trial judge to allow
amendment of the Information, charging McDonald with speeding, from
a class "C" misdemeanor to an infraction.

McDonald, in her Brief,

mistakenly focuses on the power of the prosecutor to make such an
amendment rather than on the power of the trial judge.
While it is true that the Amended Information was filed with
the court by the prosecutor, it lies solely within the discretion
of the trial court judge whether to accept such an amendment.
Rule 4 (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the
court may permit an Information to be amended.

The court does not

have to accept any amendment filed by the prosecutor.
When looked upon in that light, the analysis of this issue
changes substantially.

The only effect of reducing the charge from

a class "C" misdemeanor to an infraction is a reduction in the
penalty

that may be imposed by the trial judge.

A class "C"

misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail
(Section 76-3-204 (3) ) and a fine of $750 (Section 76-3-301 (1) (e) ) ,
while an infraction is punishable by a maximum penalty of a fine of
$750 (Section 76-3-301(1) (e)), with no incarceration permitted.

In

effect, by allowing amendment of the charge down to an infraction,
the

trial

judge

is

agreeing,

prior
22

to

trial,

to

eliminate

incarceration from his sentencing options. The crime being charged
and its elements do not change whatsoever; this is simply an action
within the judge's discretion with regard to sentencing.
Trial court judges in Utah are granted a wide latitude with
regard to their sentencing decisions.
sentencing

may

be

overruled

only

Their decisions regarding

upon

a showing

of abuse

of

discretion, which has been described as "inherently unfair" or a
"clearly excessive sentence."
Ct. App. 1997).

State

v.

Yoder,

935 P.2d 534 (Utah

The Appellee is unaware of any Utah case law that

limits the trial judge's sentencing discretion solely to post-trial
sentencing decisions.
The analysis is similar to that conducted by the United States
Supreme Court in a Sixth Amendment "right to the assistance of
counsel" case.

In Scott

v. Illinois,

440 U.S. 367

(1979), the

Supreme Court held that if the trial court judge fails to afford a
defendant

the right to assistance of appointed counsel

in his

defense, it had the effect of limiting the trial judge's sentencing
options to non-incarceration penalties.
applied here.

By declaring

The same analysis can be

that he is going to consider

the

offense to be an infraction prior to trial, the trial court judge
has limited himself to non-incarceration penalties.

McDonald has

not been harmed by this action.

To the contrary, McDonald was

benefitted

of

by

being

relieved

incarcerated.
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the

potential

of

being

McDonald argues that her right to a jury trial was eliminated
when the charge was amended to an infraction.

However, as was

demonstrated in Argument I above, McDonald had no right to a jury
trial even if the charge had remained a class "C" misdemeanor.
Assuming arguendo

that McDonald does have a jury trial right when

charged with a class "C" misdemeanor, McDonald's two arguments that
her rights were substantially impacted by the reduction in the
penalty are still not persuasive.
First, she argues that the charge was reduced for the sole
purpose of avoiding a jury trial.
facts contained in the Record.

This charge is not based upon
To the contrary, at the motion

hearing regarding the Amendec Information, the prosecutor stated:
"The City's

interest

is we don't have the desire to give the

Defendant the possibility, hcwever slim, of facing jail time; and
we believe we have the discretion in prosecuting to represent those
interests in not trying to seek a penalty that has the possibility
of jail time."

(Record, p. 73.)

Defendant's

Furthermore, the trial judge, in

denying

the

objection

to the Amended

stated:

"I don't question the City's motives."

Information,

(Record, p. 74.)

Second, McDonald argues that the reduction in penalty has
deprived her of her substantial right to a jury trial.
disingenious argument.

This is a

In effect, McDonald is arguing that she has

a right to face the maximum penalty it is within the judge's power
to impose.

Clearly, McDonald possesses no such right.
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It is

within the discretion of the prosecutor to determine what charge
shall be brought', and within the discretion of the trial court to
determine what penalty shall be imposed.
to face the maximum penalty.

McDonald has no "right"

If the potential penalty is reduced

to the level of an infraction, such as in this case, McDonald no
longer possesses a right to a jury trial, for the reasons set forth
previously in this Brief and based upon Section 77-1-6(2) (e)of the
Utah Code.
McDonald

makes

several additional

arguments

regarding

the

reduction in the penalty associated with the speeding violation.
All of these arguments are meritless.

She argues that the City is

violating Section 41-6-16 of the Utah Code, which indicates that
local authorities may not enact or enforce rules or ordinances in
conflict with provisions of the Motor Vehicle Code.

This argument

is clearly inapplicable, since there is no allegation or indication
in the Record that the City has enacted any rule or ordinance that
conflicts

with

the

Motor

Vehicle

Code

as

specified

in

Section 41-6-16.
McDonald also argues that the trial court and the City failed
to follow the provisions of Rule 4 (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure
charges

in amending the Information.

that

NN

.

. . the City amended

Specifically, McDonald
its Information

petitioning the trial court for permission . . . .
Brief, p. 18.)
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without

(Appellant's

Rule 4 (d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
require the City to petition the court, by motion or otherwise, nor
does it require the court to hold a hearing prior to amending an
Information.

Rule 4(d) states, in part, as follows:

"The court

may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and
the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced."

The

trial court followed the proper procedure in this case, and, even
though

she

filed

no

objection

to

the

Amended

Information,

McDonald's concerns were heard by the court at the hearing on her
Motion for Jury Trial.
An

analysis

of

the Amended

Information,

in light

of

the

language of Rule 4(d), leads to the conclusion that the court made
a proper ruling.
charged

in

the

First, no additional or different offense was
Amended

Information.

The

charge

violation of Section 41-6-46 of the Utah Code.
contained

in

the

Amended

Information

possible sentence to be imposed.
McDonald were not prejudiced.

was

a

remained

a

The only change
reduction

in

the

Also, the substantial rights of
As has been stated previously in

this Brief, McDonald possessed no right to a jury trial under
either the original Information or the Amended Information.

A

right that she does not possess cannot be a substantial right.
Even if the court determines that there is a jury trial right in
the case of a class

XX

C" misdemeanor but not in the case of an
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infraction,

McDonald's

rights

are

still

not

prejudiced.

By

reducing the potential penalty to be applied to McDonald, she is no
longer facing the possibility of incarceration and, therefore, is
no longer entitled to a jury trial.

As was argued previously, the

only right that has been affected by the reduction in potential
penalty

is her perceived

right to face the maximum

penalty associated with her crime.

potential

This is a right that simply

does not exist and, therefore, is inappropriate for consideration
by the court with regard to the impact of Rule 4(d).
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court
possesses the sentencing discretion to reduce, prior to trial, the
potential

penalty

classification
infraction

faced

of a crime

and,

by

a

defendant,

from a class

therefore,

incarceration as a penalty.

by

XX

eliminating

reducing

C" misdemeanor
the

the

to an

potential

for

The Record reveals that the Amended

Information was filed and treated by the trial judge in accordance
with

Rule

4 (d) of

the

Utah

Rules

of Criminal

Procedure

and,

therefore, that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in
permitting the Information to be amended.
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DENYING MCDONALD'S REQUEST
THAT THE HEARING ON HER MOTION FOR JURY
TRIAL BE HELD PRIOR TO THE DAY OF TRIAL,
AND IN DENYING HER MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT HAD DENIED THE
MOTION FOR JURY TRIAL.
McDonald

argues

that

the

trial

court

judge

abused

his

discretion by holding the hearing on her Motion for Jury Trial on
the same day that the bench trial had been scheduled.

She further

asserts that the trial court judge abused his discretion by denying
her Motion for Continuance, which was made orally to the court
following the court's denial cf the Motion for Jury Trial and prior
to commencement of the bench trial.

McDonald's Brief completely

fails to provide this Court with any facts upon which it could
determine that the trial court abused its discretion in scheduling
the hearing and in denying the Motion for Continuance.
The Appellee has been unable to locate any Utah case law
regarding
matters

the discretion given to a trial court in scheduling
appearing

before

the

court.

However,

it

is

well

established in Utah courts that trial court judges control their
own calendars.
would

be

given

Surely, this is an area in which trial court judges
considerable

freedom

under

the

principles

appellate review discussed by Chief Justice Zimmerman in State
Pena,

of
v.

869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
Closely related, since it also involves a scheduling issue, is

the denial of a Motion for Continuance.
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Utah appellate courts have

consistently held that the decision to grant or deny a continuance
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
State

disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion.
v.

Horton,

848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see

Cabututan,
In

also

State

v.

any

abuse

of

861 P.2d 408 (Utah 1993).
this

discretion

case, McDonald

whatsoever

on

has

failed

the part

of

to show
the

trial

court

judge.

McDonald admits in her Brief that any scheduling problems created
by holding the hearing on the Motion for Jury Trial on the day
scheduled for a bench trial could have been easily corrected by the
court, since the court could have issued a continuance for the
purpose

of

assembling

a

jury

if

it

had

granted

the

Motion.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 22.)
Furthermore, McDonald's arguments that she was prejudiced by
the decisions of the trial court are without merit.

First, she

claims that she was deprived of the opportunity to negotiate or
accept a plea bargain.
case.

This argument ignores the facts of the

On May 1, 1996, the judge conducted a pretrial conference in

this case, at which time plea negotiations were unsuccessful.

The

transcript contained in the Record also indicates that a negotiated
plea bargain had been available to McDonald up until the day before
the hearing and subsequent bench trial.

(Record, p. 74.)

Finally,

McDonald obviously has no right to a plea bargain, and she has not
provided case law that would indicate otherwise.
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McDonald's second argument is that she was prejudiced when the
Motion for Continuance was denied, because her trial preparation
was geared to presenting her case to a jury, and she did not have
time to adjust her trial strategy for a bench trial. This argument
once again ignores the facts cf the case and conflicts with her own
argument regarding the Motion for Jury Trial hearing.
1996, the court issued a Notice of Bench Trial.

On June 13,

(Record, p. 34.)

Therefore, she had seven days' notice that the trial to be held on
June 20, if any, was to be a bench trial.
made should have been made for a bench trial.

Any preparations she
By her own argument

on page 22 of Appellant's Brief, McDonald acknowledges that no jury
was assembled on June 20 and that the court would have had to grant
a continuance to assemble a jury had it granted her Motion for Jury
Trial.

Therefore, it is crystal clear that she was well aware that

no jury trial would be held on June 20, and that if any trial was
to be held, it would be a bench trial.

If she was unprepared to

proceed with a bench trial on that date, it is wholly through the
fault of McDonald and her counsel, and certainly not the fault of
the court.
McDonald's argument, that she was prejudiced and that the
trial court abused its discretion in denying her a hearing date
prior to the trial date and in denying her Motion for Continuance,
is without merit, and should be disregarded by this Court.
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IV.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN SENTENCING MCDONALD TO A
FINE THAT EXCEEDS THE RECOMMENDED FINE
SET FORTH IN THE UNIFORM FINE SCHEDULE.

It is well established

that trial court judges have wide

discretion in their sentencing decisions.

In State

v.

Wright,

893 P.2d 1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the court stated:
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal
unless the trial court has abused
its
discretion, failed to consider all legally
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that
exceeds legally prescribed limits. State
v.
Nutall,
861 P.2d 454, 457 (Utah App. 1993);
accord
State
v. Gibbons,
779 P.2d 1133, 1135
(Utah 1989) . An abuse of discretion may be
manifest if the actions of the judge in
sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the
judge imposed a "clearly excessive" sentence.
State
v. Russell,
791 P.2d 188, 192-93 (Utah
1990) (quoting State
v. Gerrard,
584 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1978). The exercise of discretion
in
sentencing
necessarily
reflects
the
personal judgment of the court and the
appellate court can properly find abuse only
if it can be said that no reasonable [person]
would take the view adopted by the trial
court. Gerrard,
584 P.2d at 887 {citing
State
v. Harris,
10 Wash. App. 509, 518 P.2d 237
(Wash. 1974) .
Wright,

at 1120.

The court has also stated:

"This court

A

may only find abuse

"if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court."'" Yoder,

at 548.

Contrary to McDonald's assertion otherwise, the bail set in
this

case

was

(Record, p. 1.)

$57, as

shown

in the

notice

of

the

citation.

The sentence imposed by the court was a fine of
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$60 and attendance at traffic school, which costs $30 to attend.
This fine and traffic school requirement are obviously within the
$0 to $750 range of fines applicable to infractions.
The

penalty

in

this

case

is

certainly

not

excessive,

inherently unfair, or such that no reasonable person would take the
view adopted by the trial court.
Finally, in her argument McDonald refers to the Uniform Fine
Schedule as if it set a mandatory fine amount from which the judge
cannot

stray.

This

Section

76-3-301.5(5)

is

certainly

not

the

law

in

Utah.

of the Utah Code, which establishes

the

Uniform Fine Schedule, specifically states: "This section does not
prohibit the court from in its discretion imposing no fine, or a
fine in any amount up to and including the maximum fine, for the
offense."
McDonald makes no credible argument supporting her claims that
the sentence was excessive or unfair.

Therefore, the sentencing

decision of the trial court should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the City respectfully requests that
McDonald's appeal be denied, and that the conviction be affirmed.
DATED this

C >>

day of July, 1997.
WEST VALLEY CITY

Vv^jJ Richard Catten, Senior Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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